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n Europe, software falls under a copyright regime  12 . Copyrights, and 
more generally intellectual property rights (IPRs), grant developers a 
temporary, exclusive right to reproduce and distribute the underlying code, 
as well as to develop derived works3. For software, one can distinguish 
proprietary and open source licensing. In the case of proprietary software 
(PS), the underlying source code is typically not disclosed so that tinkering 
(*) This paper is based on BIJLSMA et al. (2009), a report commissioned by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (the Netherlands). We gratefully acknowledge extensive comments by 
colleagues at CPB, participants at the annual conference of NOiV (Utrecht, 5 March 2009), and 
two anonymous referees for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 In the US, software is protected by patents, which pertain to ideas and come into existence 
after an application filed to the patent office has been granted. Copyrights aim at protecting the 
embodiment of ideas and apply automatically. Although we focus on copyrights, the thrust of 
our reasoning also applies to patents. 
2 Arguably, copyrights are not perfect, since they protect software as a work of art or literary 
work, and therefore might not offer sufficient protection against reverse engineering. Instead, 
software developers may rely on trade secrets (i.e., not releasing the source code except under 
strict conditions, combined with penalties in case of breach of agreement or confidentiality), 
which are not recognized as IPRs. 
3 See GALLINI & SCOTCHMER (2002), GUIBAULT & VAN DAALEN (2005), McGOWAN 
(2005) and STIGLITZ (forthcoming). 
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with the software by others cannot take place. Consumers or firms can only 
use a particular program with permission of the license owner. To obtain 
consent, users have to accept the license conditions and, in many cases, 
have to pay for the use of the software. Using or distributing the software 
without the permission of copyright owner constitutes a violation of copyright 
law. Open source software (OSS) "[...] has freely available source code 
enabling the licensee to inspect, use, improve, expand and distribute the 
source code" 4, under the conditions specified by the original license. OSS 
licenses typically use a watered down version of copyrights, in the sense 
that the licensor claims less rights than he can potentially claim. Just as in 
the case of PS, not complying with the license conditions violates copyright 
law.
From an economic point of view, the traditional idea behind IPRs is to 
protect the incentives for innovation by ruling out unauthorized copying and 
imitation. Therefore, one might think that OSS causes innovation processes 
to stall. Interestingly, this is not necessarily the case. In a recent empirical 
paper, LERNER (2009) reports a negative relationship between patent 
protection and innovation. As STIGLITZ (forthcoming) argues "[...] many of 
the most important intellectual advances are not covered at all by the patent 
system" (p. 105). BESSEN & MASKIN (2004) observe, related to the growth 
of the Internet, that "[...] the economic model underlying this traditional 
argument is surprisingly limited. […] Indeed, innovation is often sequential, 
where each creator improves on the work of the previous iteration" (p. 2). 
The basic idea is that when the innovation process is interactive and 
sequential, OS development may stimulate this innovation, which it 
ultimately helps to create value for society. BOLDRIN & LEVINE (2009) 
challenge the conventional wisdom with a theory of diminishing returns in 
knowledge creation; if knowledge creation is cumulative, patents reduce 
welfare.
Our paper explores the observation that in software markets, both strong 
and weak protection of intellectual property may foster innovation, 
depending on the characteristics of the software market at hand. Thus, 
sometimes it may make sense to stimulate OSS, while in other cases, PS 
works better for innovation. We discuss innovation incentives and market 
failures in software markets, and based on this, discuss what policy makers 
can do to alleviate market failures. 
4 Ministry of Economic Affairs (2007), p. 6.  
For a formal definition see http://www.opensource.org/docs/osd. M. BIJLSMA, P.W.J. DE BIJL & V. KOCSIS  57 
The relevance of our paper is illustrated by various policy initiatives 5. For 
example, since 2007, the Dutch government has actively stimulated the 
adoption of OSS in the public sector 6. France has been considering the 
promotion of OSS by public administrations at least since 1999, although it 
took longer before concrete initiatives were adopted. Currently, the 
Gendarmerie Nationale is a prominent example of an organization that 
switched to OSS on a large scale. In Spain, a plan was adopted in 2003 that 
called for the adoption of OSS when available and adequate. The broad 
scope of proposals observed in practice demonstrates the relevance of 
pinpointing the economic rationale behind public support for OSS. 
The substance of our arguments comes from recent literature on 
innovation. An important reference is Bessen and Maskin (forthcoming), who 
argue in favor of weak IPR protection when innovation is interactive and 
sequential. There exist various papers related to ours, that contain policy 
analyses of the relative merits of OSS and PS  7. Whereas SCHMIDT & 
SCHNITZER (2003) recommend against any policy intervention that directly 
promotes OSS, we argue that depending on the market failures that may 
occur, intervention may be desirable. MAURER & SCOTCHMER (2006) 
argue that "[…] open source incentives reduce agency problems and 
deadweight loss compared to patents, and accelerate discovery through 
automatic disclosure [but] often lead to an under-supply of goods [and] may 
also be less responsive to certain users, especially when those users are 
non-programmers" (p. 313). Further, as LEE (2006) states, the "policy 
considerations that inform government decisions are extremely complicated 
and sometimes interdependent" (p. 112). The complexity stems from the 
technological aspects related to various forms and combinations of market 
failures that may occur in specific markets – they are not uniform for the 
software market as a whole. 
Note that our paper does not address anticompetitive behaviour in 
software markets, for instance related to bundling and exclusionary 
behaviour. Our focus is on situations in which a supplier may have a 
dominant position, in particular due to customer lock-in, but is not abusing 
5 See http://www.osor.eu, the website of the Open Source Observatory and Repository for 
European public administrations (OSOR). 
6 “The Netherlands in Open Connection”, Ministry of Economic Affairs (2007). 
7 MENDYS-KAMPHORST (2002) analyzes the impact of open source projects on competition. 
SCHWARZ & TAKHTEYEV (2009) relate the success of open source software to the fear of 
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that position. In such cases, competition law enforcement has no bite. 
Nevertheless, public policy may be able to increase welfare. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section discusses 
development incentives and market failures in software markets. The 
subsequent section discusses the role of the government. The conclusion 
recapitulates our findings. 
  Characteristics of open source and proprietary software 
Incentives to participate in OSS development 8
Why do individual software developers (not employed by firms) 
voluntarily contribute to OSS projects? A programmer, when participating in 
software development, faces a variety of private benefits and costs9. We 
assume that he or she decides to participate in a project if the benefits 
outweigh the costs.  
PS developers employed by firms receive direct payments in the form of 
wages or performance-contingent rewards. Independent OSS programmers 
do not necessarily receive such payments, while the nature of OSS licenses, 
to some extent, makes selling the software more difficult. Therefore, they 
must be driven by incentives to exert effort other than direct monetary 
payments. These incentives may be both intrinsic and extrinsic in nature10.
The most relevant extrinsic motivations are: (i) benefits from own use, (ii) job 
market signalling (peer recognition and professional status enhancement), 
and (iii) self-education (skill enhancement). Note that (ii) and (iii) may also be 
motivations for programmers working on PS, and may relate to future 
monetary pay-offs. An intrinsically motivated person derives utility from an 
activity itself, or from psychological aspects directly related to it (such as 
altruism, meritocracy or reciprocity). 
8 Based on LERNER & TIROLE (2005a, 2005b), MAURER & SCOTCHMER (2006) and 
MENDYS-KAMPHORST (2002). 
9 Costs include the opportunity cost of time, such as the forgone compensation from another 
task or the value of leisure time. 
10 See also HANN et al. (2004) and LAKHANI & WOLF (2005). M. BIJLSMA, P.W.J. DE BIJL & V. KOCSIS  59 
Why do profit-maximizing firms develop OSS? A software-developing firm 
may generate revenues from selling the software or related complementary 
products and services. It faces initial software development costs. These 
costs are substantial when development, besides programming skills, 
requires expensive, specific inputs, such as scarce expert knowledge. After 
this initial investment cost has been incurred, the incremental production and 
sales costs are small, as copies are easily made. 
The expected financial benefits of developing OSS should outweigh the 
costs of giving up the profits that arise from selling the software under a 
proprietary license. Open source projects initiated by private firms should 
therefore meet two requirements. Firstly, implementation of the project 
should be feasible. Private firms developing OSS face several challenges in 
this respect. For instance, it helps if the project can be divided into separate 
modules on which programmers can work independently, so that the 
innovation process benefits from open interaction. Also, the firm must be 
able to commit to keep the source code disclosed, for example by 
surrendering control over the project to outside parties, or by choosing a 
licence that forbids the software to be reverted to PS (e.g. General Public 
License or GPL). Secondly, the open source project must be economically 
viable. OSS developers do not — unlike PS developers, who have the 
exclusive right to market their products by selling their rights or licensing to 
others — directly derive market power from their license11. Everybody can 
use, improve and distribute the software for free. Thus, OSS has to be 
profitable for other reasons. One possible business model is what Lerner 
and Tirole (2005a) call "living symbiotically". OSS may generate revenues in 
complementary and proprietary activities, such as support, education, 
training, and complementary PS. Another rationale to develop OSS may 
arise when a firm is lagging behind a PS supplier but sees the possibility that 
its product will be successful as OSS, thereby increasing profitability in 
complementary segments (LERNER & TIROLE, 2005a). Open source 
development may also counter-weigh the dominant position of a competitor, 
or it may increase reputation and visibility in the long run (HENKEL, 2005). A 
final source of revenues may stem from reduced development costs. Firms 
can pay employees lower wages because they are intrinsically motivated. 
Development costs may be lower because of external development support, 
debugging and software maintenance by OSS communities. 
11 We define market power as the ability to charge a price above marginal cost (a mark-up). 60     No. 74, 2
nd Q. 2009 
Market failures in software markets 12
There is a variety of potential market failures in software markets. Market 
failures result in sub-optimal prices, quality or innovation levels. For policy 
makers it is therefore important to understand potential market failures and 
the ways in which they affect welfare. Software markets typically exhibit the 
following market failures: knowledge spillovers, market power, and 
economies of scale. 
Knowledge spillovers occur if firms benefit from knowledge creation by 
others. We distinguish between imitative spillovers (slightly differentiated 
products based on an existing technology) and creative spillovers (follow-on 
innovations that extend the original technology to a significant extent). 
Imitative spillovers reduce an innovator's profits and hence reduce the ex
ante incentives to innovate. Creative spillovers arise when the innovation 
process is interactive, so that developers improve on each other's 
contributions. If a firm does not take into account the additional benefits due 
to creative spillovers when making investment decisions, there may be too 
little investment from a social viewpoint. This effect is particularly 
pronounced when upfront development costs are large: not taking into 
account spillovers may then have the effect that a socially desirable 
investment that is privately unprofitable, is not carried out. 
Market power, another type of market failure, is in software markets often 
caused by customer lock-in. This phenomenon typically occurs when there 
are network effects or switching costs. Network effects arise when the utility 
that a user derives from consumption increases with the number of other 
users of the same (or a compatible) product 13 14. One can distinguish two 
types of network effects. Direct network effects arise when consumers value 
a particular piece of software more when there are more other users of the 
same or compatible software (office applications are an example). Indirect 
network effects arise when consumers value a particular software program 
12 This sub-section draws on FARRELL & KLEMPERER (2007), SCHMIDT & SCHNITZER 
(2003), SHY (2001) and MAURER & SCOTCHMER (2006). 
13 This is the definition from KATZ & SHAPIRO (1985), who use the term “network 
externalities”, just as most of the subsequent literature. LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS (1994) argue 
that this should better be called a network effect. They reserve the term "network externality" for 
network effects in combination with unexploited gains from trade with regard to network 
participation. Their aim is to make precise when the presence of network externalities leads to 
welfare distortions. 
14 Network effects can be present both on the demand side and the supply side of software 
markets. For our purposes, we abstract from supply-side effects. M. BIJLSMA, P.W.J. DE BIJL & V. KOCSIS  61 
more when a larger number of complementary applications exist (e.g. in the 
case of PC operating systems) 15. When users cannot communicate with the 
majority of other users, network effects may complicate or distort consumers' 
decisions to choose between incompatible programs. Thus, a market failure 
may occur when users cannot coordinate the transition from one equilibrium 
outcome to another one. An example is a switch from operating system 
Windows to Linux, or from the Microsoft office application suit to 
OpenOffice). When such a coordination problem occurs, some users may 
get stuck with the program that has the largest customer base but may 
nevertheless be a second choice regarding quality or specifications.  
Switching costs, another cause of lock-in, arise when consumers incur 
costs when they switch to another technology, product or supplier. Switching 
costs for instance occur because of the need to learn how to use a different 
product, to buy new compatible software programs 16 or to search for an 
alternative product. ZWIEBEL (1995) provides an alternative rationale for 
switching cost, arguing that managers, to protect their reputation or because 
of a lack of information, may abstain from switching to an alternative solution 
that is superior to the industry standard or the product of a dominant, well-
known supplier. 
Economies of scale form another potential source of market failure. 
Software markets are characterized by economies of scale because the 
development of the  "first copy" of a product entails a fixed cost, while the 
costs of producing additional copies are close to zero. Scale economies are 
particularly pronounced for software requiring a costly input of expertise 
complementary to programming skills, that is painstakingly developed by 
specialists other than software developers (and can easily be copied). Think, 
for instance, of expertise related to complicated econometric methods (as in 
the case of advanced statistical software), specific accounting and business 
administration skills, well-trained user support (as in the case of business 
administration software), or graphic designer skills (as in the case of high-
end games). The presence of scale economies makes it necessary that 
suppliers charge a price above marginal cost, in order to remain viable. 
15 One could add here the presence of ‘applications barriers to entry’, which occur, for instance, 
if no one can compete with an existing operating system without having a sufficient number of 
applications running on it. To some extent, this situation may be seen as a case of indirect 
network effects, or alternatively, as a two-sided market (ROCHET & TIROLE, 2006). 
16 Close standards, for instance, restrict the exchange of files between users of different 
applications, therefore making switching costly. 62     No. 74, 2
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  The potential role of the government 
If market failures exist, government intervention may be able to improve 
market outcomes in terms of welfare. We will discuss which roles the 
government could take up and how they relate to the potential market 
failures that may occur  17. Attention will also be given to the potential 
negative side effects of government intervention, that is, government failure. 
Government policy 
IPRs address knowledge spillovers: (i) they provide protection against 
imitation of an innovator's idea, and (ii) they allow the innovator to 
appropriate surplus from third-party follow-on innovations through licensing. 
A proprietary license is a common way to make use of the protective power 
of IPRs. Accordingly, through the prospects of financial recoupment, a 
proprietary license safeguards the incentives to exert development efforts. In 
the absence of proprietary licenses, software with substantial, initial 
development costs would perhaps not be developed. Such types of software 
are therefore best brought to the market as PS. Furthermore, PS tends to 
cater for the tastes of the "average" consumer and therefore has a larger 
potential market. The reason is that PS development is driven by expected 
profits, which is affected by consumers' willingness to pay, and thus by the 
benefits consumers expect to derive from it (See also SCHMIDT & 
SCHNITZER, 2003)  18. Therefore, a profit maximizing firm will prefer to 
invest in software that appeals to a broad group of "unsophisticated" users 
(who are not programmers by profession). In the absence of proprietary 
licenses, innovation, particularly in the initial stage where consumers' needs 
do not yet play an important role, would be primarily driven by the motivation 
of individual software developers themselves (MAURER & SCOTCHMER, 
2006) 19. These incentives do not take into account the needs of an average 
user. Thus, OS development provides fewer incentives to appeal to a broad 
group of users. Note that without commercial motives, certain ideas get a 
17 It is outside the scope of this paper to compare the effectiveness and the pros and cons of 
the different policy options that are available. 
18 Note, however, as VON HIPPEL (2002) argues, it is sometimes costly for firms to follow 
heterogeneous consumer needs, for example because it is hard to know individual consumers’ 
preferences or it is impossible to differentiate prices. 
19 For commercial open source projects, e.g. in which profits are meant to be generated 
through complementary products and services, this argument does not apply. M. BIJLSMA, P.W.J. DE BIJL & V. KOCSIS  63 
chance to be developed that would not stand a chance to be adopted in a 
commercial environment. At a later stage, it may turn out that a fraction of 
these ideas do lend themselves for commercial exploitation. Thus, OSS may 
help to "let a thousand flowers bloom", some of which may turn out to 
become mass market products at a later stage. 
It is important to note that IPRs introduces its own distortions. First, the 
market power derived from IPRs may be strengthened by network 
externalities, switching costs, and economies of scale. Market power may 
therefore be substantially higher than necessary to safeguard innovation 
incentives. This comes at a cost for welfare: (i) mark-ups create a 
deadweight loss resulting from reduced demand 20; (ii) market power may 
facilitate anti-competitive behaviour, especially when customer lock-in 
effectively results in an entry barrier. Second, the appropriation argument 
above assumes that an innovator and a producer can contract efficiently. 
However, efficient contracting may not be possible due to information 
asymmetries, or if contracts are incomplete. Information asymmetries may, 
for instance, arise when the contribution of follow-on innovators is 
unpredictable, or if the value of potential contributions is private knowledge 
of contributors. Competitors who want to build on an existing innovation may 
have useful ideas about how such innovations can be achieved, that are not 
available to the original innovator. In that case, proprietary licenses may 
slow down the speed of innovation relative to the socially optimal level of 
innovation. This is essentially the approach taken by Bessen and Maskin 
(forthcoming), who develop a model of sequential innovation with private 
information about development costs. They note that the welfare loss that 
occurs when an innovator is unable to appropriate the surplus from follow-on 
innovations, need not occur when IPRs are weak (or under open source 
licensing). When a software license allows for the use of the source code by 
others, follow-on innovations can take place without hindrance. In their 
model, whether weaker or stronger protection is optimal depends on the 
specific details of the distribution of the social value generated by 
innovations. They find that weak protection is optimal if valuable follow-on 
innovations are sufficiently likely. Thus, if efficient contracting is not possible, 
certain socially valuable follow-on innovations will not emerge under 
proprietary licensing, while they would occur under open source licensing. 
Therefore, if there is no need to purchase expensive, specific inputs from 
20 The deadweight loss is reduced if firms can engage in price discrimination, and thereby 
increase the number of users of their products. 64     No. 74, 2
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specialists outside the software community, open source licenses result in 
higher social welfare 21.
Thus, there exists a fundamental trade-off between ex ante incentives to 
innovate and ex post efficiency. While IPRs are a response to knowledge 
spillovers, they may introduce new distortions, by creating market power or 
slowing down the innovation process. Now, when consumers can easily 
switch to other suppliers, this will not be a problem, since superior 
technologies will then be able to establish a position in the market. However, 
when there is a serious problem of customer lock-in, this may be 
problematic. In such cases, it may be worthwhile to stimulate OSS in order 
to overcome customer lock-in, that is, to alleviate the coordination failure in 
the market. An alternative solution, when network externalities are present, 
is to guarantee a seamless exchange of files between users, for instance 
through enforcement of open standards. 
Whether intervention is desirable depends on which licensing regime 
dominates from a welfare perspective, and which market outcome can be 
expected to arise in the absence of government intervention. To derive 
policy recommendations we will assess whether stimulating OSS creates 
downward price pressure (and improves "static efficiency"), or that, in 
addition, it impacts the endogenous emergence of technologies and 
efficiently results in more innovation (and improves "dynamic efficiency") 22.
There may exist a trade-off static efficiency and dynamic efficiency, located 
on the right-hand side of the inversed U-shaped curve depicting the 
relationship between competition and innovation (AGHION & GRIFFITH, 
2005). In particular, it is possible that intensified competition reduces 
innovation incentives, for instance if the market is already competitive, so 
that further increasing the intensity of competition would lead to cut-throat 
competition, by eroding the margins needed to invest in innovation. 
However, a serious problem of customer lock-in typically results in a low 
intensity of competition to start with. In such a situation, increasing 
competition tends to go hand in hand with increasing the incentives for 
innovation, and will therefore increase dynamic efficiency (a move to the 
right on the left-hand side of the inverse U-shaped curve). 
21 The incentives provided by PS may co-exist with some of the advantages of OSS, especially 
when there are informal or enforced standards to ensure interoperability and compatibility 
between applications and file formats. 
22 See BENNETT et al. (2001) for definitions of static and dynamic efficiency. M. BIJLSMA, P.W.J. DE BIJL & V. KOCSIS  65 
Now consider a market situation in which PS dominates, while OSS plays 
a minor role. This is a natural point of departure to assess whether it makes 
sense to stimulate OSS. In the short run, stimulating OSS typically increases 
the intensity of competition, since it introduces downward price pressure on 
proprietary products 23. Software users will not be willing to pay high prices if 
a comparable product can be obtained for free. In addition, when there is 
customer lock-in, stimulating OSS, for instance by acting as a lead 
customer, may help to overcome entry barriers, thus further increasing static 
efficiency. Stimulating OSS is therefore, in general, good for static efficiency. 
Whether or not stimulating OSS increases or decreases dynamic efficiency 
is pivotal in justifying government policy, because long-term welfare effects 
are typically of a higher order of magnitude. However, the effect of 
stimulating OSS on dynamic efficiency is ambiguous and more difficult to 
assess. For software requiring expertise complementary to programming 
skills at a substantial cost, a business model based on PS tends to lead to 
more innovation, since it is more suitable to get development off the ground. 
Stimulating OSS may then reduce dynamic efficiency. Moreover, if efficient 
contracting on follow-on innovation is possible, developers with market 
power can provide (efficient) firms that wanted to develop follow-on 
innovation with the source code, in return for (a part of) the profits that these 
new products will generate. If this is the case, stimulating OSS will not lead 
to more follow-on innovations than the efficient level. Nevertheless, if 
efficient contracting of proprietary source code is not feasible, then 
stimulating OSS will lead to a higher and more efficient level of 
innovation 24.
Based on the previous discussion, we suggest the following policy 
guidelines. Policy makers should first consider whether serious customer 
lock-in is present in the market. If so, it has to be assessed what type of 
business model, if any, is the most appropriate in terms of dynamic 
efficiency and in the light of the other market failures that may occur in 
software markets. 
Suppose first that there is no serious customer lock-in problem. Should 
the government then intervene in order to stimulate OSS? At the demand 
side, customers do not face serious hurdles to switch to new entrants. At the 
23 This depends on the extent to which OSS and PS offerings are substitutes. For instance, for 
a long time, Linux was not been seen as a fully fledged substitute for Windows. 
24 To avoid broad-brush sponsoring of a wide range of pet projects, with all the inefficiencies 
that go with it, a potential need for government intervention arises only at a later stage, when 
markets for some of the “thousand flowers” have already come into existence. 66     No. 74, 2
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supply side, entrants (whether they offer PS or OSS) do not face substantial 
entry barriers impeding them from competing with an existing software 
supplier 25. When such entrants are more efficient or innovative, they will be 
able to gain market share quickly. Market processes are therefore likely to 
result in an efficient constellation of software offerings and types, and there 
is no need to interfere with the market-driven emergence of innovations. 
Abstaining from ex ante intervention and, if necessary, relying on 
competition law enforcement, is then the best option to avoid distorting 
market processes (we will come back to this). 
Second, suppose that there is a serious problem of customer lock-in. 
Then, in a market dominated by an incumbent offering PS, new entrants 
may have too little chance to enter, even if they offer a superior product at a 
lower price. Now the question is whether there are indications suggesting 
that, from a welfare perspective, PS is a superior business model compared 
to OSS. As we discussed, an important point is that from a welfare 
viewpoint, OSS is not the best business model in all circumstances. We 
identified two conditions that determine whether OSS or PS business 
models are optimal: (i) software development may require a specific, 
complementary input at a substantial cost, and (ii) there may be no 
obstacles with regard to efficient contracting on follow-on innovations. If both 
conditions are satisfied, this indicates that PS performs better than OSS in 
terms of dynamic efficiency. It may then not be wise to introduce policy 
specifically aiming at stimulating OSS. Actively stimulating OSS in such 
markets conflicts with the effectiveness of PS-based business models, and 
can lead to distortions of dynamic efficiency. However, note that generic 
policy to reduce customer lock-in (e.g. by enforcing open standards and 
seamless exchange of files) could be desirable. If only condition (i) holds, 
policymakers have to assess that stimulating OSS does not hurt firms' 
incentives to innovate. If only condition (ii) holds, then stimulating OSS will 
probably not efficiently increase the level of innovation. If neither condition 
holds in a specific software market, then, besides enhancing competition by 
generic instruments, directly stimulating OSS by specific policy may be very 
useful to help the market overcome customer lock-in. We discuss generic 
and specific policies below. 
One can now construct the following decision tree for policy makers. 
25 We abstract from capital market imperfections. M. BIJLSMA, P.W.J. DE BIJL & V. KOCSIS  67 
Decision tree for policy makers 
Let us apply this framework to some tentative examples, meant to 
provide an illustration and first intuition on how to use our framework 26.
x  In the market of advanced statistical and mathematical software, lock-
in problems are less substantial than in markets where customers exchange 
files and applications on a continuous basis (e.g. operating systems and 
office applications). Hence network externalities form no substantial barriers 
to enter the market. Other entry barriers may of course exist, but those are 
likely to be less problematic. 
x  Also in the case of advanced statistical software, development costs 
are high due to the need of specific, complementary inputs, that is, experts 
who understand complicated econometric methods and statistical 
procedures. Therefore PS may be more appropriate to provide for cost 
recoupment possibilities. Nevertheless, an entrant offering a superior 
alternative will be able to take over the incumbent's position and recoup the 
necessary investment. Examples in which the development of software does 
not (or to a lesser extent) require complementary, specific inputs, are 
internet browsers and web content management software. 
26 The examples are not meant as a call for policy measures – further analysis is needed in 
specific cases. 68     No. 74, 2
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x  In the case of high-end interactive games, in which players spend 
significant amounts of time playing with each other, network effects are 
strong, creating entry barriers. At the same time, the need to purchase 
advanced graphical skills makes the development costs high. Similarly, there 
may be high switching costs in the market of enterprise resource planning 
software. Development of business administration software may require 
specific inputs, like specific accounting and business administration skills, 
that increase development costs significantly. In these cases, PS-based 
business models may do a better job in cost recovery. 
x  PC operating systems also exhibit substantial (indirect) network 
externalities and switching costs. However there is relatively less need for 
specific, complementary expertise (beyond adequate programming skills) to 
develop such software. Thus there is no indication that PS performs better 
than OSS in stimulating innovation. By stimulating OSS in a way that creates 
a significant installed base for rival offerings, consumers' barrier to switch 
can be reduced substantially. Other examples where this argument applies 
are office software (text editors, type setting applications, spreadsheets, and 
presentation editors) and enterprise content management software. 
One can distinguish between generic and specific policy tools. We call a 
policy tool generic if it addresses a market failure independently of the type 
of software (e.g. characterized by the license form). When policy intervention 
targets OSS, we classify it as specific. 
Let us first discuss generic policy tools. Firstly, facilitating or mandating 
interoperability (in the sense of compatibility) between competing products 
can help to internalize network externalities by allowing consumers of 
different software programs to exchange files in a seamless manner (see 
also LEE, 2006). This type of intervention may be particularly important 
when PS suppliers have incentives to hinder interoperability, for example by 
implementing closed standards in order to preserve their market power, or 
by fiddling with the specifications that files generated by competing software 
have to comply to. Secondly, to lower the perceived (non-financial) switching 
costs of consumers, the government could improve transparency of software 
offerings by facilitating the provision of information about the availability, 
price and specifications of products and relating services. Note that these 
types of ex ante policy intervention may also involve, to a certain extent, the 
application of competition law (ex post intervention), with the purpose of M. BIJLSMA, P.W.J. DE BIJL & V. KOCSIS  69 
keeping the market open for innovation and ensuring that ultimately 
consumers decide which standard, technology or product will win 27.
We now turn to specific policy tools. The government can stimulate OSS 
by acting as a lead customer, for instance by promoting or even requiring the 
use of OSS in the public and semi-public sector or by imposing OSS as a 
requirement in public procurement. Specific policy may be effective in 
"tipping" the market towards a viable market share for OSS. The underlying 
mechanism is that by doing so, the government creates a critical mass of 
users of an OSS alternative, making it more attractive for other consumers to 
follow. Note that large corporate clients may also more easily adopt OSS if 
purchasing managers can motivate their choice for OSS by pointing to the 
fact that well-established organizations also purchase OSS (ZWIEBEL, 
1995).  
The set of policy tools discussed here is not exhaustive but rather an 
overview of relatively light-handed types of intervention. In particular, our 
shortlist does not include demand subsidies (e.g. government sponsored 
distribution of OSS amongst citizens, teaching in schools) or supply 
subsidies (e.g. tax subsidies for software developers developing OSS, 
annual prizes for the best OSS product). 
Government failures 
It is important to acknowledge that good intentions are not sufficient to 
motivate government interventions, since they can have benefits as well as 
costs. Accordingly, to be able to conclude that a policy indeed corrects a 
market failure, one must ask whether it actually reduces the inefficiency or 
welfare loss that was caused by the market failure. In other words, one must 
take into account the possibility of government failures, which are failures 
that arise when the government introduces a new inefficiency "because it 
should not have intervened in the first place or when it could have solved a 
given problem [...] more efficiently, that is, by generating greater net 
benefits" (WINSTON, 2006, pp. 2-3). 
Unfortunately, unlike the standard list of potential market failures on 
which economists agree, there is no received wisdom with regard to 
potential government failures. Ultimately, the effects of intervention can only 
27 For more on this in the light of the European Microsoft court case, see LAROUCHE (2008). 70     No. 74, 2
nd Q. 2009 
be assessed empirically. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is useful 
to consider three important types of failure that should be taken into 
consideration before implementing a specific policy. 
Firstly, when the government acts as a lead customer or steers the 
market in other ways, there is no guarantee that it makes a choice that is not 
inferior to choices made at a decentralized level by market participants. This 
type of argument is a standard criticism in the economic literature on 
innovation policy, where economists usually recommend against policies 
that aim to pick or support winners (BOONE & VAN DAMME, 2004). As 
SCHMIDT & SCHNITZER (2003) argue in the context of software markets, 
independently of the presence of market failures, an inappropriate product 
choice could tip the market in the wrong direction, and by doing so, 
competition and innovation incentives may be reduced. 
Secondly, policy makers may not be able to assess properly the long-
term success of a publicly supported OSS project, for instance due to 
incomplete information. As a result of public procurement biased towards 
OSS, a currently profitable and efficient provider of PS may then lose its 
incentives to invest. 
Thirdly, government procurement processes based on a bias towards a 
certain type of technology, which involves making choices between different 
projects or suppliers, invites lobbying by candidate suppliers, and typically 
introduces inefficiencies due to rent-seeking behaviour. 
  Conclusions 
The important market failures in software markets are market power, due 
to network externalities, switching costs or economies of scale, and 
knowledge spillovers. Software developers may be driven by monetary as 
well as non-monetary incentives. When intervening in software markets, 
policy makers have to take into consideration that there may exist a trade-off 
between reducing market power and encouraging follow-on innovations on 
the one hand, and preventing firms from free riding on other firms' efforts to 
innovate on the other. In other words, there may exist a trade-off between ex 
post efficiency and ex ante incentives. Whether this trade-off exists or not, 
determines what business model is optimal from a welfare perspective. If so, 
PS tends to be optimal, if not, then OSS has strong advantages. More 
precisely, we pointed out that proprietary business models tend to perform M. BIJLSMA, P.W.J. DE BIJL & V. KOCSIS  71 
better in terms of innovation if development costs are high due to the need of 
costly, specific inputs and when optimal contracting on license fee about 
derived works is efficiently feasible. In contrast, open source business 
models tend to dominate proprietary business models, if there is no need to 
purchase expensive inputs complementary to programming skills, creative 
spillovers are socially valuable, and proprietary licenses are too restrictive to 
provide sufficient incentives for follow-on innovations. Note that these are 
stylized arguments – specific cases require separate, more detailed studies. 
Before discussing the policy recommendations, let us stress that specific 
instead of generic policy options require a strong motivation, because of the 
risk of government failure. In practice, competition policy and making sure 
that consumers can "vote with their feet" are the best candidates to 
counterbalance market power and reduce entry barriers. The reason is that 
consumers are better informed about their own preferences with regard to 
new products than the government. 
The extent to which ex ante intervention in addition to general 
competition policy is advisable depends on the presence of market failures. 
First of all it has to be assessed whether there are serious customer lock-in 
problems in the market. If so, policy intervention may be recommendable, 
depending on which business model better safeguards or stimulates 
innovation incentives. If proprietary business models perform better, generic 
policy options (not specifically aiming at OSS) may reduce customer lock-in 
and lower entry barriers. Examples of generic policy options are requiring 
interoperability or compatibility, and increasing transparency of software 
offerings. Stimulating OSS can be recommendable when open source 
business models dominate in terms of innovation incentives. Specific policy 
options that can help to alleviate customer lock-in problems and increase 
dynamic efficiency are, for instance, acting as a lead customer or requiring 
OSS in public procurement. 72     No. 74, 2
nd Q. 2009 
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